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Introduction
Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, Indonesia has been noticed by the interna-
tional community as the largest Muslim country in the world (Mujani & Liddle 
2004, pp. 110-11; Ananta et al. 2005). This recognition is because Indonesia 
has hinted more progress and improvement in democracy and human rights 
than other Muslim countries such as Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan. Freedom of 
press, the implementation of fair general elections, the distribution of power 
among the state institutions (trias politica) and some many others are main 
indicators depicting the rapid democratisation of Indonesia. Besides that, as 
the largest Muslim country in the world – with approximately 200 million-
Muslim population – the Muslim people of Indonesia do not demand the im-
plementation of sharia state, but rather commit to democracy which is imple-
mented in the form of Pancasila state1 as the choice of their political system. 
This is of course the distinctiveness of Indonesian Islam. It is true that there 
are many Islam-based parties and organisations, but there has no one poli-
tical party or one of mainstream Islamic organisations that want to overtly 
change Indonesia from Pancasila to an Islamic state. Radical ideas screamed 
by small militant groups of Indonesian Islam such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia 
(HTI, Indonesian Liberation Party), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Coun-
cil of Indonesian Muslim Fighters), Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT, Community 
Helpers of God) to enforce the political system of Islam – caliphate and a total 
implementation of sharia system [Islam kāffa) – and are not strongly welcome 
by Indonesian Muslims. 
To the fine model of Indonesian Islam, German Chancellor Angela Merkel seems 
to agree that Indonesia remains a beautiful country for its respect to religious 
diversity and pluralism and as a successful model for a Muslim democratic 
country in the world.2 The last event, on 31 May 2013, although Indonesian 
human rights activists and also moderate Muslim groups had immensely pro-
tested this honouring, but AFC (Appeal of Conscience Foundation) in New York 
remained endowing “World Statesmen Award” to Mr. President Susilo Bambang 
Yudoyono (acronymised with SBY). This award was endowed to praise the suc-
cess of SBY in nurturing religious freedom and tolerance in Indonesia. All the 
above impressions and wishes indicate that the international community still 
believe Indonesia as the largest Islamic democratic and tolerant country in 
1 The elaboration on the Pancasila state will be seen later.
2 http://www.dw.de/merkel-signals-religious-tolerance-in-indonesia/a-16088132, viewed 
on 17 November 2013.
6the world that can be a mirror or example for other Muslim countries regar-
ding how to manage peacefully relationship between religion and the state. 
However, on the different side, some reports on the implementation of human 
rights especially religious freedom presented by local and international NGOs 
such as Setara Institute, CRCS of Gajah Mada University, and Human Rights 
Watch indicates that some challenges for democracy because of shariatisaion 
movement of some aspects of Indonesia (Setara Institute 2010; Cholil et al. 
2009b; Human Rights Watch 2013).
The contrasting national phenomena of Indonesia mentioned above have caught 
me into the battle of a narrative: “whether it is true or not that Indonesia can 
be claimed as successful country in managing relation between religion and 
politics (the state)?” This article seeks to highlight how the state and religion 
(Islam) integrate and disintegrate each other and what a creative advantage 
and disadvantage are resulted from the attachment and detachment of re-
ligion from the state or the state from religion in the context of Indonesian 
politics. To know that, this article emphasises the history of Islam or the ma-
king of Indonesian Islam and its compatibility with the principle of modern 
state applied in this country considering that Islam in Indonesia is rather dif-
ferent from Islam in some Islamic Middle East countries. The role of Islamic 
civil society organisations in promoting a “different Islam” in Indonesia is also 
elaborated here besides also the role of Islamic political parties. This paper 
also sees how Pancasila as the sole ideology of the state and how different 
groups has competed for this ideology in the post reform era, the revitalisa-
tion of Islam indicated by the emergence of Salafi-Wahhabi groups and how 
all these determine a connection between Islam and state in the current and 
future circumstance of Indonesian politics.
Compatibility between Islam and Modern State
Jose Casanova stated that public religion is compatible with modernity – de-
mocracy and civility (Casanova 1994). This statement is rather different from 
the dominant discourse of sociology that usually designates religion in an 
asymmetrical position to the state or politics. The colonial sociology has long 
been in pessimistic way in understanding the emerging role of religion espe-
cially Islam in the public and legal sphere of such Islamic country. 
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In the Western Christian tradition, the relation between religion and the state 
is clearer than in the Muslim tradition. Stipulated by their bitter experience 
on the politicisation of religion by Churches in their Middle Ages era, the 
Western Christianity reached at a conclusion regarding the need of separating 
the domain of religion from the domain of the state (secularism). The history of 
Islam does not have similar issue with this, therefore, whether or not religion 
is part of the state or whether or not Islam has a particular imposed form of 
the state” remains debated until the present situation. 
Theoretically speaking, the position of Muslim scholars regarding separation 
between Islam and the state is divided into two groups. First, those who be-
lieve that Islam prescribes a specific form of state which is claimed to have 
reference to the history and tradition of the Prophet Muhammad and his pre-
decessors. From this point, Islam and the state is one-united entity or popu-
larly called political Islam. This discourse is for instance propagated by Abu 
A’la al-Maududi, Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb (Kurzman 2002). These 
Muslim scholars argue that the injunctions of the Qur’an about the unity of 
Islam and the state are clearly mentioned. They also refer to the leadership of 
Muhammad as a historical fact about that he was the political leader of his 
community. Interestingly, the sovereignty of God’s governance is often resulted 
from a literal understanding on Islam (ẓāhiriyya and ḥarfiyya). Second, those 
who believe that Islam does not suggest a specific form of Islam and the state. 
This group argue that what have been done by Prophet Muhammad in his era 
was not his situation as the leader of the state, but as imām (spiritual leader) 
of his community. This discourse is propagated by ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Rāziq (Egypt), 
Saʿid al-ʿAshmawi (Egypt) (Shepard 1996, p. 39), Muhammad Arkoun (France), 
Abdurrahman Wahid (Indonesia) and Nurcholish Madjid (Indonesia) and many 
others. These thoughts are a result of contextual thinking of Islam.
Each group is claiming that their opinion is more legitimate and has strong 
fundamental basis in the tradition of Islam than other groups. It is evident in 
the practice of Muslim community in implementing the matters of their sta-
tecraft which is also divided along with the theological debate of Islamic dis-
course as mentioned above. First, Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
Pakistan, Jordan, and some others prefer to have an Islamic state, locating Islam 
as sole source of state normativity. In this system, the most referred-values in 
the statecraft are sharia values. God’s law is the supreme law, indeed. Second, 
Indonesia and Turkey take a different adherence to the connection between 
Islam and the state. The Muslim people of Indonesia and Turkey can accept 
their state to become as a neutral state, perceiving a state as a non-aligned 
8space to the intervention of religion. Both Indonesia and Turkey do not use 
Islam as sole source of the state’s legitimacy. 
Although Islam is not totally embedded within the political system of Indone-
sia and Turkey, both countries are not anti-religion in their daily political and 
legal practices. The state law of Indonesia and Turkey, for instance, remains 
giving a space for the practice of religion or belief. In Indonesia, for instance, 
Islamic personal laws are accommodated their practices in the court of sha-
ria (Indonesian: Mahkamah Syariah) and it applies only for Muslim people. 
Although it is not yet admitted as the state law, Indonesia also has drafted the 
Compilation of Islamic Law (Kompilasi Hukum Islam, KHI). In Turkey, Islamic 
personal laws are regulated under the portfolio of Diyanet (Office of Religious 
Affairs) which is actually also for Muslim people (Rabasa & Larrabee 2008, p. 
12; Rubin & Çarkoglu 2013). 
The accommodation of certain religious practices and legal provision in the 
domain of the state for certain religious adherent are based on an argument 
that every people or believer has rights to be protected their religion or belief. 
This is of course an argument which is also promoted by the modern demo-
cratic countries. In short, because both Indonesia and Turkey see that Islam 
is compatible with democracy, therefore, a democratic political system is en-
ough for them. 
Although Muslim people do not have a bitter experience with their religion as 
it was faced by the European Christian society in the historical past of Dark-
Ages, but to some extent, in the modern era, the discourses and practices of 
Islam that favours Islam as both religion and state system on one hand and 
Islamic theocratic countries that strictly apply Islam as their sole system on 
the other hand are facing complexities living in the modern democracy. Most 
of them have problems in dealing with some practices of democracy that li-
terally seem to be in the opposite direction from what they practice and think 
of their political Islam. In the Islamic theocratic countries, when the political 
Islam contradicts democracy, argument derived from the political Islam is pri-
oritised because it refers to the law of God and the law of God never falls into 
mistake, whilst democracy is more probably wrong. In the classical debates 
of Islamic theology (kalām), the law of God is the supremacist law, lā ḥukma 
illā Allāha, there is no rule but God. The Qur’anic verse, wa man lam yahkam 
bimā anzala Allāhu fa ulā’ika hum al-kāfirūn, anyone who does not rule with 
God’s law are judged idolaters, is employed by the propagators of the pro-sharia 
state groups as argument that Islam orders a specific model of governance. 
The most prominent representatives of this model in the modern Islam are (1) 
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Sunni-Wahhabis government in Saudi Arabia3 (Vogel 2000)and (2) Shiʿa-Islamic 
Republic of Iran (Brunner 2011; K. Farsoun & Mashayekhi 1993).
Both sides of the Sunni-Wahhabis Saudi and Shiʿis Iran, although there are 
different in their Islamic belief-system, are having similar concept on the su-
premacy of God’s law. Both countries are also very active in propagating and 
stipulating their ideas for other Muslim countries to apply their model of Isla-
mic theocratic state. Because of their strict adherence to their literal interpre-
tation of Islamic concept on the unity of Islam and the state, the presence of 
their discourse and practice are creating incompatibilities. Most of the modern 
states are embracing the supremacy of human consensus, not the supremacy 
of God’s law. Most of their problems are solved under the consideration of hu-
man consensus. But this is not for the Islamic theocratic countries. Therefore, 
in this regard, it is understandable if the pro-sharia groups are restless or even 
in conflicts to both the ideas and practices of democratic states. The Taliban 
group of Afghanistan and Pakistan have problem with religious freedom and 
women rights in particular and with secular system generally (Skaine 2002). 
Al-Qaeda also has a serious problem with a secular state system which is also 
happening with the Hezbollah group in Lebanon (Harik 2005). Al-Qaeda claims 
that democracy has failed in Afghanistan and they use this failure as a space 
for eschewing international Jihadism (Morgan 2007, p. 64). 
Their disagreement or contention to the products of modernity is mostly ba-
sed on their understanding that the Western world through democracy and 
human rights are dominating the Muslim world. To make a counter of balance 
or to end the domination, they struggle for promoting Islam or sharia as the 
world system. Unfortunately, to some degree, method and strategy they employ 
for promoting their ideas are not always based on a peaceful means such as 
through dialogue, discussion and exchange of experience and discourse, but 
through violence and enmity. It also creates an image that Islam is the source 
of violence. The al-Qaeda and Taliban for instance are deploying violence as 
vehicle for challenging the secular ideas of the West or those who are defined 
by them as group that follow more or less system and ideas of the West that 
separate religion and the state. In this regard, what the pro-sharia groups are 
putting Islam vis a vis human-created ideology. Theologically speaking, this 
strategy degrades the position of Islam which is beyond ideology. Unfortu-
3 Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt (Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Quṭb) and Jama’ati al-Islami 
of Pakistan (Abu A’la al-Maududi) are also considered as the model of the political Islam, 
but their resonance is not quite strong in other Muslim countries. The first ruling by the 
leader of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Mohammad Morsi was toppled by the military 
regime of Egypt. 
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nately, the model of al-Qaeda and Hezbollah or the model of Wahhabi-Saudi 
regime and Islamic Republic of Iran are often associated by the international 
community with Islamic terrorism and radicalism.   
The above image is closely related with what Casanova reveals that religious 
movements – Islamic movements – in the 1980s have created a public dis-
course that religion was depicted as source of Islamic militancy and radicalism. 
Jurgen Habermas calls this circumstance as an unexpected of revitalisation of 
faith and belief (Siebert 2010, p. 295). The most repeated images covered in the 
international media to legitimise the given theoretical statements is cases of 
the Iranian Revolution 1979 and some Islamic insurgencies like al-Qaeda ter-
rorism and Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. In fact, these Islamic groups assume 
that democracy is crafted by human being therefore Muslim believers are not 
recommended or even banned to follow this model for their political system. 
The Wahhabi regime of Saudi Arabia for instance sees that the practice of the 
political Islam by other Muslim countries as deviant too when it is not in accor-
dance with the values of Wahhabi Islam. On the different side, the Shiʿa Islam 
also views that the concept of Islamic Republic of Iran is the only legitimate 
political system within Islam. They makes truth-claim on a system which they 
prefer to by intentionally capitalising religion. They know that a truth-claim 
which is based on religion is more easily perceived by Muslim people than a 
truth-claim which is based on democracy because religion-based truth claim is 
revealed by God whilst democracy is based on human consensus. All everything 
which is literally mentioned in God’s law are not the subject of change, whilst 
all everything which is created by human beings the sovereignty to interpret 
it belongs to the human beings and this is not sharʿī (not based on sharia). In 
short, it can be said here that Islam is compatible with the modern democratic 
state when this religion is implemented through contextual approach. Islam 
which is understood and implemented based textual approach will have more 
difficulty in dealing with democracy and modernity. Indonesian Islam is mostly 
implemented through the contextual approach.  
History of Indonesian Islam
Regarding connection between Islam and the state, Indonesian Islam is different 
from Islam implemented in both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Although the variety 
of international Islamic discourse prescribing the importance of unifying Islam 
and the state in a single entity (al-dīn wa al-dawla, Islam is a religion and 
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the state) has also landed in the land of Indonesia, but this idea is not popular 
among ordinary Muslims of Indonesia. Instead of adopting al-din wa al-dawla 
for their political system, Indonesian Muslims prefer to have the Pancasila state. 
Indonesian Islam relatively shares and coexists peacefully with democracy and 
civility. Robert Hefner, an American anthropologist, describes Indonesian Islam 
generally as a civil Islam, which is compatible with democracy (Hefner 2001; 
Hefner 2011). Many observers associate the civility of Indonesian Islam with 
the historical process of Islam comes to Indonesia. This section is intended to 
highlight how its propagators transfer and then develop Islam as the greater 
religion in the archipelago of Indonesia.
Although historians are still dissenting in their opinions regarding when Islam 
comes to Indonesia, but most of them agree that peaceful process and means 
are the ways of Islam to arrive in this archipelago. It means that there had no 
wars and significant tension between the propagators of Islam – coming from 
Middle East, India and Persia – and the local people of the archipelago who 
have already had local religions and beliefs with them. Commerce, mix-mar-
riage and other cultural encounters were very effective in this regard. Besides 
that the role of ṣūfī is very determinant in imposing moderate aspect into In-
donesian Islam. All these factors are causing Islam in Indonesia are different 
from Islam in other places.
It is true that Indonesia has had some Islamic kingdoms such as in Aceh, South 
Sulawesi, Central Java and many others, but Indonesian Muslims prefer to ad-
opt principles of a modern state that refer to the tradition of nation-state in 
the West than their system of governance. In such period, it has also been a 
different colour of Islam in Indonesia that tended to use formalistic approach 
as the strategy of disseminating Islam which was evident through the role 
of the Padri movement in Minangkabau, West Sumatera, in the 19th centu-
ry (Parlindungan 2007; Hadler 2008). The Padri movement was a local group 
of this region struggling for hostility to the Dutch colonialism as their main 
objective. However, besides fighting against the Dutch colonialism, however, 
many historians state that the Padri movement favoured Wahhabism (an Is-
lamic stream whose tenet is based on the thoughts of Muḥammad b. ʿAbd. 
Wahhāb, an advisor for the kingdom of Ibn Saʿūd of Saudi Arabia) (Hadler 
2008). The Padri movement did not get a strong resonance in Indonesia. 
Although Wahhabism comes from the high land of Islam, using Ernest Gellner’s 
thesis on “high Islam” vs. “low Islam” (Gellner 1992; Gellner 1983), but it is 
not too popular among Indonesian Muslims who are mostly the adherents of 
Shāfiʿī school of Islamic law. In addition, some Indonesian local ulama blame 
that Wahhabism is not part of Islam (Abbas 1999). The rejection of the local 
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ulama to Wahhabism makes this movement did not gain ground in Indonesia. 
In addition, historically speaking, the establishment of Nahdlatul Ulama was a 
response to the excessive Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia that prohibited pilgrims 
for conducting ziyāra al-qubūr (vising graveyard) of Prophet Muhammad’s 
companions (Arabic: ṣaḥaba). The traditionalist Muslims who felt that visi-
ting the graveyard of pious people especially Prophet’s companion and saints 
is recommended in Islam. This is one of many reasons why the Nahdlatul 
Ulama was established.  
Besides the Wahhabism in Minangkabau, Indonesian Islam had an experience 
with local Islamic rebellion movement in West Java. The Darul Islam and Ten-
tara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII, Abode of Islam and Indonesian Islamic Army) was 
local and indigenous groups of Islamic rebels that strived for the establishment 
of Islamic state in Indonesia. The leader of this group, Kartosuwirjo stated the 
necessity of having an Islamic state in West Java. On 7 August 1949, Kartosu-
wirjo declared an Islamic state which was not only in the area of West Java, 
but also in whole of Indonesia (Federspiel 2009, p. 189; Formichi 2012). The 
government of Indonesia was officially stating that the Darul Islam/Tentara 
Islam Indonesia was an illegal organisation. Mohammad Natsir, the Leader of 
Masyumi Party as well as the chief of investigation to this movement stated a 
disagreement to the method of insurgency used by Kartosuwirjo through the 
Darul Islam for the foundation of an Islamic state, but Natsir did not condemn 
Kartosuwirjo (p. 190). The similar rebellions not only happened in West Java 
but also in Aceh and Makassar (Aspinall 2009; Dijk 1981). 
Although some historical experiences of Islamic radicalism have been with 
Indonesian Islam, but its moderate characteristics remain solider and stron-
ger than its radicalism. It can be said here that moderate aspect that went 
together with the first coming of Islam to Indonesia is really embedded and 
acceptable in this country. The given historical facts are then often used by 
historians to claim the distinctiveness of Indonesian Islam from other Islam 
in other Islamic countries. Besides that, this fact is also employed to judge 
the later development of Islam in Indonesia as a moderate and open Islam. 
What the moderate Islam means is that Islam which is able to combine and 
integrate the teaching of Islam and the tenet of modernity and democracy. 
As the citizens of Indonesia of course the group of moderate Islam is dealing 
with religious politics, but the way the group interpret and implement the 
religious politics is different from the group of political Islam. The group of 
moderate Islam strives for more substantive issue of Islam. Their interpretati-
on on Islam is revealing that Islam is compatible with democracy and human 
rights because both Islam and democracy are evolving the similar substance 
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that is the dignity of human being. The balanced Islam (Arabic: tawāzun) is 
Islam which is objectively located in accommodating the sacred and the mun-
dane. The Arabic terms tawassuṭ (moderate) and tawāzun (balance) which are 
familiarly used by Indonesian Islamic organisations such as Muhammadiyah 
and Nahdlatul Ulama are reflection of the moderatism of Indonesian Islam. 
All the given characteristics of the moderate Islam above is basically based on 
notion that Islam cannot be qualified into a specific form of the state. Islam is 
religion and the position of religion is divine and above all everything inclu-
ding democracy. Religion is immutable, but democracy is mutable. Therefore, 
the moderate Islam views that locating Islam in a certain forms of ideology – 
state system – is degrading the values of Islam.
Pancasila State
Although Indonesia has had established historical ties with Islam, this country 
does not espouse Islam as its political system. Since its independence from the 
Dutch colonial government in 1945, Indonesia declared as a non-theocratic 
state. The founding father of this country had chosen Pancasila as ideological 
and philosophical foundation of this country. The Pancasila state means that the 
polity of Indonesia follows the principles of Pancasila – from “Panca” meaning 
five, “Sila” meaning principles or verses. Pancasila contains (1) Belief in One God 
(Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa) (2) Just and civilised humanity (Kemanusiaan 
yang adil dan beradab) (3) the unity of Indonesia (Persatuan Indonesia) (4) 
Democracy guided by wisdom, consensus, and representativeness (Kerakyatan 
Yang Dipimpin oleh Hikmat Kebijaksanaan, Dalam Permusyawaratan dan 
Perwakilan) (5) Social justice for whole people of Indonesia (Keadilan Sosial 
bagi seluruh Rakyat Indonesia). Pancasila as the ideological foundation of 
Indonesia has been disputed in the early historical formation of this country. 
Based on that explanation above, there is neither clear evidence about the 
use of the word secularism (Indonesian expression: sekularisme) nor the word 
Islam in the ideology of Indonesia.
However, the preference of Pancasila as the ideology of the state is not a simple 
issue in the historical history of Indonesia. Historically speaking, in the early 
independence era, the founding fathers of Indonesia in talking about the state 
ideology were divided into two groups: First, those who wanted to formulate 
Indonesian as an Islamic theocratic state by applying sharia for those who 
were Muslims. Second, those who wanted to set up Indonesia as a non-Islamic 
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state, but nationalist and secular state. The Islamist group felt that with Pan-
casila, Indonesia cannot be called secular state, because the first statement 
of Pancasila is “Belief in the One God.” The concept of the “One God” here is 
then attempted by Muslim groups to be associated only with the concept of 
tawhīd (theological conception on the unity of God in Islam). In legitimising 
this, the first group used an argument that the contribution of Muslims to the 
independence of Indonesia in 1945 had to be paid proportionally and it can 
be done through forming Indonesia as sharia-based state. This is what they 
call a proportional gift for Indonesian Muslims as demanded by Mohammad 
Natsir from Masyumi party (Dzulfikriddin 2010; Luth 1999). The nationalist 
group accepted Pancasila because it means that Indonesia cannot be named 
as “an Islamic state” because in fact there is no a clear injunction within the 
Pancasila that the state has to refer to the tenet of Islam. Although “Belief in 
One God” is mentioned here, but it is not meant that this sentence is solely 
addressed to the God of Muslim people. This second groups (nationalist) ar-
gued that Indonesia is not only a state for Muslims but also for all citizens of 
Indonesia regardless of their religion, gender and race. Regardless of minority 
or majority, all of them are struggling for the independence of Indonesia so 
they also have same right to have a state according what they want. In the 
debate, the second group gave a warning to the Islamic group if they want to 
force Indonesia as sharia-based state, the second group would create their own 
state separating from the territory of Indonesia. The Islamic groups promoted 
for using the Piagam Jakarta (Jakarta Charter) as the ideology of Indonesia 
while nationalist group rejected and preferred to Pancasila. The Jakarta Char-
ter has similar verses with Pancasila, but with additional seven words in the 
first verse stating obligation for Muslim to carry out sharia for its adherents, 
“Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa dengan kewajiban menjalankan syari’at Islam 
bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya.” (Darmaputera 1988, pp. 151-3; Ramage 2005). 
Finally, it is agreed that the ideological foundation for Indonesia is Pancasila, 
not the Jakarta Charter. 
During the Suharto era (1966-1998), there is no such as an important consti-
tutional movement against the use of Pancasila as the sole ideology of In-
donesia. Although many Islamic groups did not agree with this legal decision, 
they just kept silence due to the oppressive policy of Suharto regime to their 
movement. Those who continued to struggle the supremacy of sharia use a 
different strategy and means such as done by Jema’ah Tarbiyah (literally means 
group of education) and the network of NII (Negara Islam Indonesia, Islamic 
State of Indonesia). The Jema’ah Tarbiyah has a ideological inclination to Ik-
hwanul Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood), (Machmudi 2008), while the NII was 
associated as a continuation of local Islamic rebel, DI/TII (Darul Islam/Tentara 
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Islam Indonesia (Dijk 1981; Formichi 2012). These two Islamist movements 
have struggled from clandestine zones to strive for making sharia for becoming 
the principle ideology of Indonesia. Different from the NII, most members of 
Jema’ah Tarbiyah has transformed their idea on sharia enforcement into the 
form of a political party, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Prosperous-Justice 
Party) (Machmudi 2008).
Actually, Pancasila is not claiming Indonesia as a secular state, but it does not 
also claim this county as an Islamic state. However, it can be said that the prac-
tice of Indonesia as a state is like what the secular state does in many places. 
One principle that Pancasila implies is its neutrality among different religions. 
The first verse of Pancasila, “Belief in One God,” for instance, is expressed in 
the word “Ketuhanan” which is in English lexicon is similar with “Godness.” 
Based on this first verse of Pancasila, theoretically speaking, the legal system 
of Pancasila neither suggests the implementation of sharia or religious law, 
nor object to the proposal of accommodating Islamic law or other influence of 
other religions to the legal system of Indonesia as far as it is in line with the 
principle of Pancasila. Indonesia has, for instance, some rulings on sharia such 
as on Islamic personal laws, but all of them apply only for Muslim believers. 
How is about the institutionalisation of religious authority into the form of 
Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA)? Indonesia establishes the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs in the national cabinet since its independence in 1945, but 
the function of the MORA is not designed to regulate and adopt a certain idea 
of religious doctrine into the legal system of Indoneasia, but to manage and 
facilitate the practice of religions. Although the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
has tried to perform its task in neutral and objective means, but the nuance of 
Islamisation remains sensible. The politicisation of the MORA for the interest 
of Muslim groups often happen because the officials of MORA are not able to 
translate the principle of the Pancasila neutrality into the daily bureaucracy of 
the MORA. The use of the MORA as a space for Muslim groups to do the Isla-
misation of Indonesia is the matter of political contestation. The tendency of 
politicisation of the MORA will always become the phenomenon of Indonesian 
politics. This is a consequence of choosing democracy as the political model 
of Indonesian polity.
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Indonesian Islam in Public Sphere and the State
When Indonesia decides to become the Pancasila state, the state is not respon-
sible for the doctrinal issue of religions including Islam. As a consequence of 
Indonesia for being non-a sharia state, therefore, the promotion of Islam in 
the public sphere of Indonesia is chiefly initiated by Islamic civil society orga-
nisations like Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama. In this system, the mat-
ters of religion are not the domain of the state, but rather the domain of civil 
society or public sphere in Jurgen Habermas’s term (Baxter 2011). Therefore, 
it is important to start the discussion by mentioning general social, cultural 
and political formation of Indonesia. Religiously speaking, as most populated 
Muslim country, Indonesia is, perhaps, different from other Muslim countries 
such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or even Malaysia. With the number of 
Muslim population which is around 86 % out 240 millions of total population, 
Indonesia is a country with uniqueness especially in relatively separating the 
territory of religion from the state. 
In daily life, Indonesian Muslims usually affiliate to one of many Islamic or-
ganisations (civil society organisations). Second largest of Islamic civil society 
organisation, Muhammadiyah was established in 1912 in Central Java, even 
before the formation of Indonesia as an independent nation-state, then the 
first largest Islamic civil society organisation, Nahdlayul Ulama was formula-
ted  in 1926 in East Java. The majority of Indonesian Muslims are the active 
members of these two organisations. Both Muhammadiyah and NU are giving 
social, religious and education services for their members. If Muhammadiyah 
has thousand schools, universities or higher educations, and hospitals, NU has 
thousand pesantren (traditional Islamic boarding schools or madrasa). Reli-
gious orientation of Muhammadiyah is rather modernist or puritan (the influ-
ence of Islamic modernism in Middle East, Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, 
Muḥammad ʿAbdu and Rashīd Riḍā) in its Islamic orientation and Nahdlatul 
Ulama is rather traditionalist and syncretic (Nakamura 2012; van Bruinessen 
1994). However, this typology is not representing the total Islamic style of 
both organisations. To some degree, Nahdlatul Ulama is more modernist than 
Muhammadiyah and Muhammadiyah is more traditionalist and conservative 
than Nahdlatul Ulama. Interestingly, both organisations are self-generating 
income and independent from the state intervention. Their sustainability not 
depends on the auspice of the state, but on their own strength. Despite the 
different facts, both organisations are now the first and second largest Isla-
mic organisations in Indonesia. As civil society organisations, Muhammadiyah 
and Nahdlatul Ulama have contributed and supported Indonesia as a Muslim 
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country that accommodates and adjust the principle of modern polity. The 
difference of both is that the former orders the religiosity of their members 
by following madhāhib (Islamic schools of Islamic) especially Shāfiʿī school 
of Islamic law, the latter refers to the Quran and Sunna (the tradition of 
Prophet Muhammad), no obligation for the member of Muhammadiyah to re-
fer to madhāhib. Both Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama organisations 
have their own social and cultural bases. The Nahdlatul Ulama is more attrac-
ting rural Muslims because this organisation provides religious precepts that 
the rural adherents of Islam feel confortable with their local and vernacular 
tradition. Indonesian urban Muslims adhere more the religious interpretation 
model of Muhammadiyah because the spirit of Islamic reformism that fulfil 
the need of urbanity. It is claimed that the member of these two Islamic or-
ganisations are more than 50 % of total population of Indonesia. Therefore, 
their position in the constellation of Indonesia’s cultural and political issues 
is really considered by the state. 
In relation to their support to the Pancasila state, since their inception, both 
organisations have tried to develop “Islam ramah” (Indonesian expression: 
smiling Islam). Of course, tension between both Muhammadiyah and Nahdla-
tul Ulama on one side and the state of Indonesia on the other side have ever 
occurred, but it has never been into a serious disagreement and contention 
between both Islamic organisations on one hand and the state on the other 
hand. In fact, both Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama – when it has chan-
ged again into civil society organisations since 1984 – never argue about the 
need of transforming Indonesia from the Pancasila state to an Islamic state 
even both have in such period of time ever had different understanding on 
the use of Islam as foundation of the country. Muhammadiyah had been long 
putting Islam as its ideological foundation, but in 1985, Muhammadiyah chan-
ged and declared Pancasila as its sole organisational foundation. One year 
before Muhammadiyah, in 1985, Nahdlatul Ulama had declared Pancasila as 
the ideological foundation of the organisation. The change of its ideological 
foundation from Islam to Pancasila is a proof of both organisations for their 
commitment to the form of Indonesia as a state that manages separately the 
domain of religion and the domain of the state.
Besides the role of Islamic civil society organisations, a limited separation 
between religion and the state was also influenced by the Suharto policy. By 
oppression and undemocratic method, limited or ad hoc separation between 
the authority of religion and the authority of the state are quite clear. Suharto 
firmly and strictly rejected any effort or attempt that wanted to bring religi-
on out from the private sphere. For Suharto, the place of religion was in the 
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private arena, not in the public one. Suharto remained allowing the practice 
of worship in the public space, but it has to be adjusted with the rulings of 
the state. 
Suharto did not welcome to the use of Islam as the foundation of Indonesian 
politics. Therefore, from 1984 to 1998, Suharto, for instance, obliged all po-
litical parties and Islamic organisations to refer to Pancasila as the sole ide-
ology of their organisations, or called asas tunggal. The asas tunggal was a 
political hint for the prohibition of using religion in the public and legal sphere 
of Indonesia. During this period, all Islamic organisations and political par-
ties use Pancasila as their sole ideology. In the 1990s, however, Suharto tur-
ned his tendency to provide a space for the revitalisation of Islam which was 
evident through his permission to his closest Minister, B.J. Habibie, to lead 
Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI, Association of Indonesian Muslim 
Intellectuals). Although the ICMI was an organisation for modernist Muslim 
intellectuals, but its formation was a precursor for the presence of Islam in the 
public arena (Hefner 1997, p. 75). The sympathy of Suharto to Islam increased 
when the support of military group slowly decreased. 
Since the establishment of ICMI, the Suharto regime was friendly to Islam. 
Muslim bureaucrats and politicians have started to be accommodated in the 
administration of the state and in the ruling party (Golkar: Golongan Karya). 
Some observers associated this movement as the mobilisation of kaum santri 
(social category for Muslim community who learned their religion) to politics. 
It was true that many modernist Muslim intellectuals gained occupied good 
positions in the Golkar party like Habibie, Din Syamsuddin and many others. 
However, the presence of ICMI is still far from being judged as the resurgence 
of formal Islam. Besides that, the voice of Muslim intellectuals was not monoli-
thic with the ICMI regarding the mobilisation of Islamic politics. Abdurrahman 
Wahid, Jalaluddin Rahmat and MH. Ainun Nadjib were examples of Muslim 
intellectuals who preferred to stand neutrally and criticised the phenomenon 
of bureaucratisation of Islam which was promoted by the ICMI. 
During the reform era of Indonesia, the role of Nahdlatul Ulama and Mu-
hammadiyah remains very significant in making and sustaining Indonesia as 
a moderate and democratic Muslim country. Besides NU and Muhammadiyah, 
we have Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Council of Indonesia Ulama, MUI). MUI is 
not an official state fatwa agency, but an independent ulama organisation. 
It has been formulated since 1975, but had gained its momentum since the 
birth of freedom in this country in 1998. If in the Suharto the MUI acted as 
the servant of the state (Arabic: khādim al-ḥukūma) since the era of reform 
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MUI changes to become the servant of Muslim community (Arabic: khādim 
al-umma). MUI states that there is no an Islamic state for Indonesia. In 2006, 
MUI declares that being the NKRI (Unitary State of Indonesian Republic) is a 
best choice for Indonesia. The given explanation seems to affirm that the three 
organisations (Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama and MUI) do agree with a 
separation between religion and state (MUI 2011). In fact, I should also realise 
that Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah and also MUI have contributed very 
much to the balanced relation between Islam and the state. However, some 
critical points since the reform era should be addressed here in relation to the 
legal interpretation of MUI on the finality of the Pancasila state for Indonesia. 
For MUI, its commitment to Pancasila state does mean that the application 
of sharia as the law of Indonesia is totally denied. MUI assumes that sha-
ria can be implemented in the national state law as far as it is procedurally 
and constitutionally done through democratic process. Adopting sharia into 
the state law of Indonesia is like adopting customary and also Western law 
into the state law of Indonesia as happening for many decades of Indonesian 
legislation process. 
islam in the Political Sphere
Besides affiliating with Islamic organisations, the Indonesian Muslims are also 
members of political parties. The active participation of Indonesian Muslims 
in politics is visible from the electoral turnout of each general election which 
is more than 70% since the reform era of Indonesia. Interestingly, the Indone-
sian Muslims are not only active in Islamic parties, but also secular and na-
tionalist parties. It is evident in the result of the general elections in which 
most Indonesian Muslims are giving their vote to secular parties namely Partai 
Demokrat (Susilo Bambang Yudoyonos’ party) Golongan Karya (Golkar, Func-
tional Group), Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP, Indonesia’s De-
morcay Partay for Struggle) and Partai Demokrat (PD, Democrat Party). Islamic 
parties such as the PKS, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, United Develop-
ment Party) Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN, National Mandate Party) and Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB, National Awakening Party) did not gain votes 
traversing the nationalist parties.
In the era of Sukarno, with the multiparty system, there were two big Islamic 
parties; Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama.4 The Masyumi party was established in 
4 The Nahdlatul Ulama was established in as jamʿiyya (Arabic expression for gesselschat) 
in 1926. When Islamic party Masyumi was established, this first largest Islamic organisa-
tion was founder of this party. The Nahdlatul Ulama divorced from the Masyumi and 
established as an independent political party. 
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the era of Indonesia under the Japanese occupation in 1945 and was a result 
of Islamic solidarity among Indonesian Islamic organisations (Vickers 2013, p. 
126). Since the beginning, this party was supported by both modernist and 
traditionalist Muslims. But later on, the traditionalist Muslims found it own 
party by reviving Nahdlatul Ulama since 1952 as a political party (Bush 2009, 
p. 49; Vickers 2013).  Both parties were struggling for Islamic agenda, inserting 
the political platform for bringing the values of Islam into the constitution 
of Indonesia. However, the Masyumi party uses the Jakarta Charter (Piagam 
Jakarta) as its primary symbolic agenda (Mujani & Liddle 2004, p. 111; Feener 
2007, p. 141). Although the Masyumi party gained significant vote (20, 9 %) and 
Nahdlatul Ulama in the second (18,4 %) (Nakamura 2012; Assyaukanie 2009, 
p. 188), but they were not successful in imposing their sharia agenda. Instead 
of surviving, the Masyumi party declined due to the involvement of its cadres 
in Islamic rebellions the outer Islands in 1956-1958 and Sukarno disbanded 
it in August 1960. The Nahdlatul Ulama was fused into one Islamic political 
party called Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party) since 
the 1970s. However, both Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama were evident about 
how the aspiration of having a sharia-based state has been struggled for the 
agenda of Indonesian Muslim.
Suharto introduced a policy of fusi politik (political fusion) which was envi-
sioned to unify or simplify (Indonesian: penyederhanaan sistem partai) dif-
ferent political parties which were based on different ideological and religi-
ous sentiment into one party. The objective of the political-fusion policy was 
actually first to change multiparty system to two party system and second to 
reduce the role of primordial issues such as religion and ethnicity from the 
politics of Indonesia. Suharto learnt from the multi-party system of Sukarno 
era that created much of instability of national politics (Hadiwinata 2006, p. 
115). It seems that Suharto knew that the multiparty system endangered his 
presidency. In this regard, Suharto was specifically afraid about an uncontrolled 
move of politik aliran (stream politics). When Suharto took a political leader-
ship of Indonesia from Sukarno, the politics of aliran (Indonesian expression 
for stream) which were grouped along with ideology, religion, and ethnicity 
were quite robust. Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Indonesian Communist Party) 
represented the ideology of communism, Partai Nasionalis Indonesia (Indone-
sian National Party, PNI) represented nationalism, the Masyumi and Nahdlatul 
Ulama represented Islam (ibid.). Suharto did not want to see that the politics 
of aliran broke up Indonesia into tension, hate, and conflict among groups of 
the different aliran. Therefore, Suharto limited the number of political party 
into three parties. Included in this policy were Islamic parties. The NU party 
and other small Islamic parties such as Parmusi, Perti and others –the Masyumi 
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was banned in the late era of Sukarno –were fused into United Development 
Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan: PPP). The PPP was the only Islamic po-
litical party vehicle for Indonesian Muslims. In short, what Suharto introduced 
in his policy on the fusion-politics was actually empowering the practice of 
secularism in the governmental system of Indonesia. Religion-based parties 
were still allowed, but they should struggle for not based on their religion, but 
based on national ideology (Pancasila). 
It is true that Suharto’s policy indicated its success in maintaining the stabi-
lity of politics, but it had to be paid with the stagnant or oppressive situation 
to the life of democracy and freedom. The Suharto policy enlightens us that 
the political stability of Indonesia which is created through an oppression or 
undemocratic means will actually produce a pseudo stability. It is evident in 
Indonesia when Suharto left power in 1998 in which Indonesian people are 
facing a political euphoria that to some extent depicting the fragile founda-
tion of the pseudo democracy which was set up by Suharto. Many of Suharto 
legacies were revisited by the coming of reform era. Indonesian people left 
Suharto for welcoming a new era called the era of reformasi. The term refor-
masi is an Indonesian expression for a new era that favours democracy and 
human rights. The multi-party system has revived again since this era and 
President Habibie (1998-1999) promoted more space for religious freedom by 
giving rights for Muslim people to use Islam as the ideological foundation of 
their parties. Many Islamic organisations that have kept silence in the Suharto 
era are going to expose their identity into public that they are using Islam as 
their ideological foundation.  
Reform era: Revitalisation of islamic ideology?
Suharto resigned from the presidency of Indonesia in 1998 because of mass 
and student movements and Habibie replaced his presidential position accor-
ding to the Indonesian law. Habibie’s presidency made the escalation of the 
ICMI politics become advancer which was evident in some important positions 
which are given to the main activists of this organisation such as taking stra-
tegic ministries like Wardiman Djojonegora (Minister of Education), Muslimin 
Nasution (Minister of Forest), Adi Sasono (Minister of Cooperation). Of course, 
their presence in the ministerial cabinet of both Suharto and Habibie regime was 
very significant for the mobilisation of Islamic politics. However, their agenda 
remained under the jargon of making Islam compatible with the needs of the 
modern state administration, not for the establishment of an Islamic state. 
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In the post Suharto era, some current developments of Indonesian Muslim 
politics and public sphere now are heading to different direction, being more 
oriented to the enforcement of sharia. This tendency has begun with to the 
deregulation of Indonesian politics introduced in the transitional era of Habi-
bie that deminished a a state legal ruling stating a compulsory for all Muslim 
organisations and political parties for basing their organisation on Pancasila. 
Habibie learnt from the previous regime that a close control through the use 
of Pancasila as asas tunggal (sole ideology of the state) has become a means 
of oppression of the ruling regime to mass organisations and political parties. 
In a democratic state, mass organisations and political parties should be pro-
tected their freedom including expression their beliefs within politics. 
As response to this policy, many mass-Islamic organisations and political par-
ties change their ideology from Pancasila to Islam such as PPP and MUI. To 
give an impression for Muslim voters, the PPP reemploy Ka’aba as its party 
symbol. The PPP originally used Ka’aba as its symbol, but in the Suharto era, 
this symbol was replaced with stars (Indonesian: bintang). The MUI also chan-
ged its ideological foundation from Pancasila to Islam after 23 years since its 
inception in 1975 with Pancasila. Some new Islamic parties and Islamic or-
ganisation are also established, using this opportunity. So far, it is true that 
they employ Islam as their ideology, but there has no one among them that 
has seriously tried to struggle for the establishment of an Islamic state in 
Indonesia. The most important Islamic party of the Indonesia’s post Suharto 
era is Partai Kesejahteraan Sosial (PKS, Prosperous Justice Party). This party 
becomes very important for Indonesia because it was established under the 
influence of Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwān al-Muslimun) of Egypt. Many 
people who predicted that the establishment of PKS is intended to undergo the 
ideology of Islamism, orienting for an Islamic polity, is not yet totally true until 
the article is written. In addition, the PKS has declared as an inclusive party 
that not only accommodate Muslim as its members, but also non-Muslims. 
The PKS also nominates non-Muslim candidates either for governor or major 
or for parliament members in non-Muslim dominant areas such as Manado, 
Papua and some others. The PKS states that this party follows the principle of 
plurality and diversity as which are unavoidable hard fact of Indonesia. The 
PKS claims that there is no tension between the vision of PKS as an Islamic 
party with the condition of Indonesia as a plural and diverse state (Rahmat 
2008, pp. 228-29). A similar statement was also introduced by Hidayat Nur-
wahid (the former president of PKS) that his party supports and agrees with 
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pluralism.5 This is an important key word for Indonesians to indicate about 
the acceptance of diversity of religions. Other Islamic parties – PPP, PKS and 
PAN – also are only rhetorically struggling for sharia, but practically they do 
nothing with sharia issues. This situation indicates how strong influence of 
“secular” concept is in the Indonesian politics. 
However, it should be noticed here that the political situation in the post of 
Suharto resignation does not merely symbolise the era of openness, but also 
the era of revitalisation of religion or ideology for the Muslim groups of In-
donesia. This is more related to the emergence of Islamic organisations than 
Islamic political parties mentioned above which are striving for quite radical 
Islamic ideology such the FPI, MMI, HTI and many others because. Their pre-
sence is different from that of Islamic parties which are open for being con-
trolled by public through the general elections. If the public does not like them, 
they can give their vote for other parties. But with Islamic organisations, the 
public cannot control them because they are not competing in public politics. 
Their-membership is floating and not proven in the general elections. Many 
issues on religious violence and discrimination to the minority groups in the 
post reform era of Indonesia are currently propagated by them. 
Some local NGOs observed that the situation of religious has decreased since 
the reform era (Cholil et al. 2009b; Cholil et al. 2009a; Setara Institute 2012; 
Setara Institute 2010). This situation was of course in contrast to the era of 
Suharto. The increasing power of the religious authority in the public sphere 
due to the political openness of this country since the reform era is more tan-
gible. Many Islamist organisations, which are not oriented to sustain or even 
against Indonesia as the Pancasila state, are tolerated to establish and propa-
gate their thoughts in both public and legal sphere. We have seen many and 
many Islamic Indonesian organisations like this, but few examples I can men-
tion here for instance Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Council of Indone-
sian Mujahidin), Front Pembela Indonesia (FPI, Indonesia Defender Front) and 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI, Islamic Liberation Party) and others. 
To some degree, since that era, some role of the state are taken over by the 
role of these Islamist organisations either formally or informally. In the Suharto 
era, it had never been seen how non-elected organisations could raise their 
order and control in the public sphere. What we often see is that how the FPI 
or other Islamic organisations play role as moral police (Arabic: muḥtasib) 
5 http://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2012/03/20/07074670/Hidayat.Nurwahid.soal.
Pluralisme.di.Jakarta, viewed on 23 November 2013. 
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and how the MUI fatwa that bans such freedom of belief and religion which 
is guaranteed in the state constitution of Indonesia can be accommodated 
within the state law. MUI whose commitment to the Pancasila state in the era 
of Suharto was highly visible, now it tends to change to a different direction. 
MUI now is the main supporter of endorsing the inclusion of sharia norm into 
the legal and public sphere of Indonesia. The MUI for instance is very active in 
promoting the legislation of sharia into the state law of Indonesia. Now, we 
have legislated sharia banks and also halal lifestyle into our laws. The sharia 
bylaws in some regional governments have begun to emerge since the reform 
era in 1998. There are almost 200 regional governments – provincial and district 
level – that adopt sharia in their local regulations. We have also some rulings 
that accommodate a particular belief – Sunni Islam – to ban other belief sy-
stem such as has happened with Joint Ministerial Decree on the limitation of 
Ahmadis activity in Indonesia. 
More than that, in 2002, some Islamic parties initiated to amend the Article 
29 of the Basic Constitution of Indonesia with Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakar-
ta, a charter that obliges Indonesian Muslims to apply sharia) or with Medina 
Charter (Arabic: ṣaḥifa madīna). This amendment was not only demanded by 
the Islamic parties, but also supported by extra parliamentary movements of 
Islamic organisations such as the FPI, HTI and MMI. This is actually a usual 
process within democratic state like Indonesia in which the parliament has 
rights to propose and amend such law. Problem arises when the parliament 
propose law which threats the basis foundation of democracy. Fortunately 
the parliamentary session rejects this proposal and Article 29 of the Constitu-
tion remains unchanging up until nowadays. However, it does not mean that 
a number of challenges that wants to delegitimise Pancasila will end up. 
The phenomena I would suggest as new threats to the democracy of Indone-
sia. Some afflicting issues related to their influence the decreasing democra-
cy of Indonesia are for instance the issuance of some governmental decrees 
banning or limiting the activities of the deviant groups. Their threat to the 
minority groups are also stipulated by the MUI fatwa in 2005 that listed some 
deviant groups that should be demolished from Indonesia (MUI 2011, pp. 34-
114). After the Joint Decree on the restriction of Ahmadiyah was signed by 
Minister of Home Affairs, Minister of Home Affairs and General Attorney in 
2008, many violence and persecution not only affect the Indonesian Ahmadis, 
but also other minority groups. The Joint Decree was intended to regulate the 
Indonesian Ahmadis, but it gives a spiral impact to regulate other minority 
groups that are judged by Islamic organisations as deviant Islam (kelompok 
sesat). Many Ahmadis are killed and their mosques are destroyed; 2 million of 
 25
Shiʿi adherents in Indonesia are under the control of the Sunni group; part of 
them who are living in Madura, a small island behind East Java province, are 
forced to leave their land; their houses and properties are destroyed by their 
neighbouring Sunni group. 500 churches are forced to close in between Ja-
nuary 2005-December 2010; the increased authority of non-elected religious 
groups in the legal and public sphere of Indonesia; policing and ordering mo-
rality in the public sphere; they act as Moral Police, controlling deviant groups 
(Indonesian: aliran sesat), attacking discotheques and cafes selling alcohol, 
prostitution areas and also blocking “house of worship” that has no building 
permit (Human Rights Watch 2013).
Indonesian Salafi-Wahhabi Groups and 
their Question on the Pancasila State
The current challenge for the democratic and harmonious relation between the 
state and religion is not from the majority of Indonesian Muslims, but from 
the revivalism of Salafi-Wahhabi group of Indonesia. It is quite obvious that 
those who are protesting Indonesia are protesting and criticising the existing 
form of Indonesian state have ideological and theological connection with the 
Salafi-Wahhabi. The group who kept silence in the Suharto era is now getting 
a right momentum since the resignation of Suharto. Although their figure is 
very few but their voice is very loud in media. The Salafi-Wahhabi group of In-
donesia delivers a hate speech to Pancasila in many occasions and places that 
they have. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Leader of Jama’ah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia, 
promotes at many times to delegitimise the Pancasila state form of Indonesia. 
He stated that Pancasila is kafīr (idolatry) ideology.6 As Muslim, Indonesians 
should reject the use of Pancasila as the principle ideology of their state. The 
Indonesian Muslims should be back to the concept of sharia state. Abu Jibril, 
a collaborator of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir released a controversial statement that 
“those who follow Pancasila as state ideology will go to the hell.” Abu Jibril 
who is an advisor of Islamic radical organisation, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia 
(MMI), delivered this statement in a mosque that belongs to the state. In fact, 
the state never reacts seriously to any discourse, campaign, hate-speech that 
challenge or denigrate to the authority of Pancasila. 
6 http://www.voa-islam.com/news/indonesiana/2013/08/14/26257/ustadz-baasyir-
pancasila-adalah-ideologi-syirik-haram-diamalkan/, viewed on 16 November 2013. 
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The Salafi-Wahhabi group of Indonesia are very aggressive and provoking in 
persuading the people of Indonesia to question the Pancasila as the ideology 
of the state, but unfortunately, they are not clear enough for the importance 
of establishing Islamic political party for containing their mission. In this re-
gard, they are divided into two largest groups; first, those who views that the 
establishment of sharia party are important and second, those who views that 
party system is against Islam because it is not based on the Qur’an, but on 
democracy. The first group seem to be inconsistent because if they want to 
change the ideology of Indonesia from the Pancasila to a total sharia law, they 
should struggle from within the existing system. This is actually problem de-
aling with the Salafi-Wahhabi. In Indonesia, there is PKS who strive for Islam 
from within the agreed system, but this party, although whose tendency to 
the Muslim Brotherhood7 is obvious, but the PKS cannot be totally claimed as 
Salafi party. Some lovers of Salafi-Wahhabi who are not anti-politics affiliate 
with the PKS, but their membership are not among their elite group.
What I want to say here is that statement like this is prevalent and it indicates 
that the state form of Indonesia is still being contested by different interest 
groups and in the process of making. All I mentioned above are consequence 
of becoming democratic state. My theoretical argument here is that democracy 
besides creating a favourable situation for lesser role of religious authority in 
the public sphere – because of its secular tendency –, it also opens a possible 
space for religious authorities to present in the public sphere. I agree that the 
increased tendency of religiosity has nothing to do with quality of democracy, 
but the growing and even more increasing presence of religious norm in the 
public and legal sphere would create problematic issue regarding the future 
of Indonesian democracy and also religious freedom. A fact that the Pancasi-
la state as a middle way or middle system of the state seems to be unable to 
stop some groups of Indonesia for recontesting a space for their ideology in 
the state. The position of Pancasila places religion as human rights therefore 
using specific form of religious teaching of a specific religion which is adopted 
into the legal sphere. 
7 The Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamic movement and political party which is associated 
with Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Quţb.
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Conclusion
The relation between Islam and the state in Indonesia is not static, but dyna-
mic. What we have seen in the Indonesian politics today is not always fixed, 
but it can change from one to another circumstance. It depends much on many 
factors ranging from cultural and legal issues. All the factors determine the 
model of relation between Islam and the state. But it seems difficult that the 
people of Indonesia will change the state form of Indonesia. This difficulty is 
not only because of the rejection of Indonesian people to have an sharia-based 
state, but because of some conceptual changes on sharia state that happen 
within the sharia propagators. Some Islamic organisations that struggle for 
changing Indonesia to a sharia state are no longer concerned with the state 
form of Indonesia, but rather interested to install sharia within the existing 
state law although the state form itself is not an Islamic state. Therefore, an 
important agenda for them is not to form an Islamic state in Indonesia, but 
promulgating sharia legislation into the state law of Indonesia. The given facts 
for instance are as evidenced in some conceptions of the FPI, MMI and MUI. 
Based the given explanation, a closer relation between Islam and the politics 
would not only symbolised through their amalgamation in an official form of 
a sharia state, but also in the sharia-infiltrated state law. 
The number of Islamic radical groups wanting Indonesia to enforce sharia law 
is few, but if the majority groups of Indonesian Muslims keep silence, the ra-
dical group would think that the majority group agree with them. Therefore, 
the success of sustaining or changing a relatively democratic circumstance 
of Indonesian politics not depends the struggle of the Islamic radical group, 
but importantly on the struggle of the majority Indonesian people that do not 
agree with them. What can be done by the mainstream groups of Islam in In-
donesia in spending their active engagement in the public and legal sphere 
for maintaining Indonesian Islam which is moderate, democratic and non-
discriminative.
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